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THE GAY ALLIANCE CASE
RECONSIDERED
By HARRY KOPYTO*
If one could posit a general thesis for Professor Black's case comment
on Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, it is that the GATE
case2 presented the Supreme Court of Canada with a choice between two
competing claims: that of the Vancouver Sun to refuse a paid advertisement
for a newspaper advocating gay rights on the grounds of public decency, and
that of the plaintiff to have the advertisement published.
While this thesis is consistent with the view taken by the majority, 3 Chief
Justice Laskin, in his brief but incisive dissent, defines the key issue in sub-
stantially different terms. He views the appeal as involving an ongoing issue
in the area of administrative law. "The problem in this case," states Chief
Justice Laskin,
is whether or not a board of inquiry ... made a finding of fact or commited an error
of law in deciding that no reasonable cause was shown by the respondent Vancouver
Sun for denying to the appellant The Gay Alliance Toward Equality, access to a
service or facility customarily available to the public, namely, the classified adver-
tising section of that daily newspaper .... 4 [Emphasis added.]
It is a trite observation that the Supreme Court of Canada, as well as
other courts of superior jurisdiction, has been repeatedly confronted with
cases raising the question of the reviewability of the decisions of statutory
tribunals. In the GATE case, section 18 of the Human Rights Code of British
Columbia 5 specifically limits appeals from a board of inquiry's decision under
the human rights legislation to "any point or question of law or jurisdiction,
or... any finding of fact necessary to establish its jurisdiction that is manifestly
incorrect."6 Therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada was bound to accept
the Board's findings of fact and did not have any jurisdiction to interfere with
the findings of fact already made.
The findings of fact made by the Board amounted to a rejection of the
Vancouver Sun's contention that the advertisement was refused because of a
concern for public decency or that such a concern played any role whatever
in the Sun's decision to carry advertisements. In fact, the Sun regularly carried
advertisements for films whose vulgarity was conceded by counsel for the
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'(1979), 17 Osgoode Hall LJ. 649.
2 Gay Alliance Toward Equality v. Vancouver Sun, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 435, 97 D.L.R.
(3d) 577, [1979] 4 W.W.R. 118 [hereinafter GATE].
3Id. at 448-56 (S.C.R.), 585-91 (D.L.R.), 119-26 (W.W.R.).
4 Id. at 439 (S.C.R.), 578 (D.L.R.), 126 (W.W.R.).
5 Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 186.
6 Id., s. 18.
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newspaper at the Board hearing.7 As Laskin C.J.C. observed, the Board of
Inquiry was fully within its rights to determine as a question of fact that the
violation of section 3 of the Human Rights Code was based on a prejudice
against homosexuals and homosexuality in general, and that such a prejudice
could not be a reasonable cause within the meaning of that section. 8
In addition to the statutory bar that restricts the court's jurisdiction
solely to questions of law or jurisdiction, there has developed in Canada and
England a body of case law suggesting that the determination as to whether
there was reasonable cause for a certain course of action is a question of
degree and a conclusion on a question of degree is a conclusion of fact,
observation and credibility.9 Thus, the determination of questions of fact, and
the weight to be given to the facts that led the Board to decide that no reason-
able cause existed under section 3 for the refusal of services, was exclusively a
decision for the Board to make and could only be interfered with by the
appellate court where there was no evidence to support the conclusion. 10
Notwithstanding these statutory and common law restrictions, the
majority judgment of Martland J. explicitly reversed the Board on its findings
of fact that the refusal of the service was motivated by a bias against homo-
sexuals l Martland J. found that the Vancouver Sun did not wish to accept
7 It was found by the Board of Inquiry (unreported judgment, 25 February 1975)
that in the issue of the Sun that should have contained the advertisement in question had
it been accepted, a number of advertisements appeared for films advertised in the Sun as
involving "group sex and lesbianism," "male nudity and sex" (op. cit., at 17). It was also
found that the advertisement in question was neither vulgar nor suggestive (op. cit., at 16).
The Board held that the Sun failed to meet the test of sincerity with respect to its pur-
ported concern for standards of public decency.
8 Supra note 2, at 445 (S.C.R.), 583 (D.L.R.), 131-32 (W.W.R.). It is instructive
to remember in this regard that one of the Board members dissented on the finding that
bias motivated the Vancouver Sun in refusing the advertisement but nonetheless concluded
that there was no reasonable cause to justify the denial of service (id. at 43).
9 Bracegirdle v. Oxley, [1946] K.B. 349 at 358, [1947] 1 All E.R. 126 at 130, 176 L.T.
187 at 190-91; In Re K. (An Infant), [1953] 1 Q.B. 117 at 130, [1952] 2 All E.R. 877 at
884-85, [1952] 2 T.L.R. 745 at 752 (C.A.); In Re W. (An Infant), [1971] A.C. 682 at
698-700, [1971] 2 All E.R. 49 at 55-56, [1971] 2 W.L.R. 1011 at 1020-21 (H.L.); R. v.
Higgins, [1948] 1 K.B. 165; [1947] 2 All E.R. 619, 117 L.J.R. 442 (C.C.A.). The question
of what motivated the Sun in its denial or discrimination is also a question of fact,
observation and credibility, and constitutes a finding of primary fact. See British Laun-
derers Res. Auth. v. Borough of Hendon Rating Auth., [1949] 1 K.B. 462 at 471-72, [1949]
1 All E.R. 21 at 25-26, 118 L.J.R. 416 at 421 (C.A.); Bracegirdle, op. cit. The credit or
weight due to the facts that lead the Board to make its findings of fact in this particular
case were for the Board to decide and their conclusion could only be interfered with by an
appellate court where there is no evidence to support the conclusions, see Bracegirdle, op.
cit., at 353, 358 (K.B.), 127, 130 (All E.R.), 188, 190-91 (L.T.); R. v. Fredericks (1962),
47 M.P.R. 324 at 333, [1963] 1 C.C.C. 271 at 281 (N.S.S.C.); R. v. United Auto Wrecking
(1966), 67 D.L.R. (2d) 545, 56 W.W.R. 490 (B.C.C.A.).
10 See British Launderers, id.; Bracegirdle, id. at 353, 358 (K.B.), 127, 130 (All
E.R.), 188, 190-91 (L.T.); Fredericks, id.; In re K., id. at 121 (Q.B.), 878 (All E.R.), 746
(T.L.R.); In re W., id. at 699, 721-22, 724, 727 (A.C.), 55, 75, 77-78, 79-80 (All E.R.),
1020, 1041, 1044, 1046-47 (W.L.R.); R. v. McBride (1973), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 430 at 444,
[1974] 1 W.W.R. 500 at 566, 15 C.C.C. (2d) 154 at 158 (B.C.C.A.). The Board's con-
clusions on findings of fact are always subject to the limitations in law placed on the triers
of fact by section 3 (1) of the Human Rights Code.
1l Supra note 2, at 455 (S.C.R.), 591 (D.L.R.), 125-26 (W.W.R.).
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an advertisement seeking subscriptions for a publication that propagates the
views of the Gay Alliance. He went on to point out in his brief judgment that
the refusal in this particular case was not based upon any personal characteris-
tic of the person who sought to have the advertisement inserted in the Van-
couver Sun, but rather because of the content of the submitted advertisement. 12
This view of the facts was not shared by Dickson J. who pointed out in
his dissent that the newspaper's concern with the decency of the advertisement
was specifically rejected by the Board of Inquiry and that the real reason
for the refusal to publish was personal bias against homosexuals on the part
of various individuals within the management of the newspaper.13 The news-
paper therefore failed to establish reasonable cause. As reasonableness is
normally a question of fact and as there was an absence of convincing proof
that the Board of Inquiry misunderstood the evidence or misdirected itself
in law, he concluded that the appeal should be dismissed.'
4
In dealing with the argument of the Vancouver Sun's counsel that a news-
paper should not be compelled to accept advertisements that it can reasonably
be said will harm its reputation and standing, Dickson J. pointed out that,
"what counsel was really asking this court to do is make new findings of
fact."' 5
Having identified concern over the decency of the advertisement's con-
tents rather than bias against homosexuals as the cause for the rejection, the
Court proceeded to determine whether the plaintiff had been denied "any
accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public" as a
result of this new finding of fact. The majority of the Court determined that
due to a daily disclaimer published by the Vancouver Sun, which reserved to
itself the right to edit the contents of advertisements, the provision of adver-
tising space was not a service customarily available to the public.' 6 Therefore,
the majority dismissed the appeal.
This was not the first time that the character of the advertising services
to which access was denied was considered in the judicial proceedings in-
volving GATE. On February 25, 1976, the Board of Inquiry had stated a
case for the consideration of the Supreme Court of British Columbia setting
out the following three questions as requested by the Sun:
(a) Was the board correct in law in holding that pursuant to section 3(1) of the
Human Rights Code of British Columbia that classified advertising was a service
or facility customarily available to the public?
(b) Was the board correct in law in holding that the Sun denied to any person or
class of persons any accommodation, service or facility cusomarily available to
the public or discriminated against a person or class of persons with respect to
any accommodation, service or facility customarily available to the public pur-
suant to section 3 (1) of the Human Rights Code?
12 Id. at 456 (S.C.R.), 591 (D.L.R.), 126 (W.W.R.).
13 Id. at 470 (S.C.R.), 602-603 (D.L.R.), 146-47 (W.W.R.).
14 Id. at 471-72 (S.C.R.), 603-604 (D.L.R.), 147-48 (W.W.R.).
15 Id. at 472 (S.C.R.), 604 (D.L.R.), 148 (W.W.R.).
10 Id. at 455 (S.C.R.), 591 (D.L.R.), 125-26 (W.W.R.).
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(c) Was the board correct in law in holding that the Sun did not have reasonable
cause for the alleged denial and did not have reasonable cause for the alleged
discrimination?17
However, when the stated case came to be heard by MacDonald J. of
the Supreme Court of British Columbia, the Vancouver Sun did not present
argument on the first two questions set out in the stated case but addressed
argument only to whether it had reasonable cause for the denial of services.
When the case was appealed further by the Vancouver Sun to the Court
of Appeal of British Columbia, the Sun once again restricted its argument to
the existence of reasonable cause for the denial of services and did not raise
the first two issues mentioned in the original stated case.' 8 Similarly, when
the case came to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada, the Vancouver
Sun did not raise these two questions either in its oral presentation or in the
two memoranda of law that it had filed with the court. As Laskin C.J.C.
pointed out, no issue was taken by the Vancouver Sun in the Supreme Court
of Canada that its classified advertising section was a service customarily
available to the public.' 9 No dispute was raised about the refusal of access to
the appellant association of the classified advertising sections of the Vancouver
Sun.
Dickson J. addressed this issue in the following terms in his dissent:
Before the board of inquiry it was contended that the classified advertising columns
of the Sun newspaper were not a "service customarily available to the public", but
this argument was not pursued in the British Columbia courts or in this court, and I
therefore give it no further heed. It is common ground that the Gay Alliance was
denied the opportunity to have the proffered advertisement published. Only one
issue is left in this appeal, namely, whether the board of inquiry convened to con-
sider the complaint erred in law in holding there was no reasonable cause for
refusing the advertisement 2 0
Notwithstanding that these two issues were never raised in the previous
appeal hearings, the majority in the Supreme Court of Canada felt it necessary
to deal with them. Martland J. specifically indicated that the two questions of
law that had not been argued raised an important issue involving the ability
of the British Columbia Legislature through its Human Rights Code to restrict
the traditional discretion of newspaper publishers to control the contents of
their own newspapers.2 '
It is unusual for a court to determine an issue on a question of law that
has already been conceded by a party. In fact, the law in this area has devel-
oped to the stage of evei forbidding a party from raising a point he has
already conceded. In Scott v. Fernie Lumber Co. 2 Buff J. stated:
It is, perhaps needless to say that in these circumstances, but for the legislation here-
inafter referred to, the rule long established, which holds a litigant to a position
17 Cited in the judgment of Branca J.A. at the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
See Vancouver Sun v. Gay Alliance Toward Equality (1977), 77 D.L.R. (3d) 487 at 490,
[1977] 5 W.W.R. 198 at 202-203 (B.C.C.A.).
18 Id. at 491 (D.L.R.), 203 (W.W.R.).
19 Supra note 2, at 441 (S.C.R.), 480 (D.L.R.), 128 (W.W.R.).
20 Id. at 458 (S.C.R.), 593 (D.L.R.), 136 (W.W.R.).
21 Id. at 453 (S.C.R.), 589 (D.L.R.), 123 (W.W.R.).
22 (1904), 11 B.C.R. 91 (S.C.).
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deliberately assumed by his counsel at the trial, would preclude in this Court any
discussion of the sufficiency of the findings to support the judgment. The rule is no
mere technicality of practice; but the particular application of the sound and all-
important maxim-that litigants shall not play fast and loose with the course of
litigation-finding a place one should expect, in any enlightened system of forensic
procedure.2 3
As Laskin C.J.C. points out, it has been conceded in the courts below that a
facility customarily available to the public was denied to the plaintiff herein
and the appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was on a previously conceded
ground. 24 It goes without saying that a court should not reopen an issue of
this sort when the plaintiff in whose favour the point had been decided would
himself not be able to do so.
The implications of the Supreme Court's finding that the Sun's advertising
services were not services customarily available to the public may be quite
far-reaching. Professor Black suggests that the Court's reasoning creates "a
narrow exception that applies specifically to publishers. '25 While it would be
desirable to share his optimism, it would appear more likely that the weight
given by the majority to the importance of the disclaimer may provide a
dangerous precedent. Institutions and individuals offering services to the
public may mask a policy of discrimination behind a published reservation
that may be ostensibly innocuous but in practice directed against an other-
wise protected group. The party responsible for the discrimination might also
adopt the argument of the majority that the service being offered was not the
actual service being performed (whether it be a service performed by a
restaurant, hotel, recreational facility or a utility) but the service itself
subject to the reservation.
Professor Black seems to recognize the immense danger of this aspect
of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision, for he observes that "human
rights statutes would be useless if businesses could exempt themselves simply
by posting a notice saying, 'We do not serve women or Indians.' "28l But his
attempt to deny the danger in this case is not entirely successful. For example,
he fails to appreciate that the narrowing of the scope of the service using a
reservation as an excuse would have the same discriminatory effect as a
decision to permit discrimination with regard to the service offered.
In dealing with the decision's impact on the meaning of the words
"reasonable cause," Professor Black argues that the decision should not be
interpreted to restrict the words "reasonable cause" to denials based on per-
sonal characteristics.2 7 However, that is precisely the point that Martland J.
makes when he argues that the refusal, because of the contents of the adver-
tisement, placed it outside the scope of the Code. 28 The very heart of Mart-
land J.'s argument is that in this particular case the discrimination and denial
of services was based upon the contents of the advertisement and not upon a
231 d. at 96.
24 Supra note 2, at 441 (S.C.R.), 580 (D.L.R.), 128 (W.W.R.).
25 Supra note 1, at 651.
20 Id.
27 Id. at 652.
28 Supra note 2, at 456 (S.C.R.), 591 (D.L.R.), 126 (W.W.R.).
1980]
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personal characteristic of the member of GATE who sought to place the
advertisement. That such an argument could be used as a ruse to mask real
discrimination against individuals because of their personal characteristics was
underlined by Laskin C.J.C. who referred to this argument using an interesting
anology referred to by Professor Black:
Counsel for the Vancouver Sun would have it that although it could not discriminate
against a person on the ground that he had only one eye-that would be a dis-
crimination related to an attribute of the person-it could refuse an advertisement
soliciting subscriptions to a periodical for the blind because of newspaper policy
against accepting such an advertisement.
The argument is a desparate one, seeking to circumvent the question of reasonable
cause, which is the only question to be decided once it is determined that a service
or facility customarily available to the public has been denied to a person whatever
his attributes.2 9
Professor Black's suggestion that the words "reasonable cause" should be
limited to conduct in some way related to unequal treatment of an identifiable
group is not supported by the wording of the Human Rights Code itself.
Furthermore his assertion that the legislature did not intend to "prohibit any
form of unreasonable conduct whether or not it relates to discrimination"2 0
is inappropriate in the context of human rights statutes and is not supported
by the history of the bill enacting the Code.
In fact, the context of the British Columbia Human Rights Code is sub-
stantially different from that of other provincial human rights codes.
The fairly short, simple Code, which established a bold and innovative
scheme for enforcing human rights, was passed in the first year of the existence
of British Columbia's New Democratic Party government under ex-Premier
Barrett. While the Code continues the traditional formula of outlawing
discrimination on enumerated grounds such as age, sex, colour and nationality,
the provision in the Code that outlaws discrimination in public facilities
against anyone-unless reasonable cause exists for such discrimination-was
a conscious decision of that government.31 According to statements made by
the labour minister who was responsible for enacting the legislation, its in-
tention was to prohibit discrimination against groups like the aged, homo-
sexuals and handicapped people who are not specifically referred to in the
Code.32 In fact, when the Code was passed, the provincial labour minister
proclaimed on November 10, 1973, that "homosexuals will be protected
under the human rights code.' 3
The protection of unspecified groups by the inclusion of the "reasonable
cause" prohibition did in fact broaden the scope of human rights legislation
in a manner that has seldom been seen in Canada. In practice, under the
leadership of the director of the human rights branch, and with the backing
29 Id. at 447 (S.C.R.), 584 (D.L.R.), 133 (W.W.R.).
30 Supra note 1, at 653.
31 Gay Tide, September 1977 (No. 17) at 3.
32 Id. See also The Province, November 10, 1973 at 8; Vancouver Sun, November 10,
1973 at 14.
33 Id.
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of the then NDP labour minister, the human rights branch administering the
Code established an impressive series of precedents. The human rights branch
persuaded the government to raise the pay of several hundred women in the
province's hospitals, thereby enforcing the concept of equal pay for work of
equal value. 34 The branch successfully prevented, on the grounds of dis-
crimination, the British Columbia College of Physicians and Surgeons from
forcing immigrant doctors to practice in remote areas of the province.3 5 The
branch ordered the RCMP to pay its female police clerks as much as male
guard dispatchers since both did substantially the same work.36 A woman
fired from her job because she was pregnant was found to have been dis-
criminated against.37
In the process of interpreting section 3, the human rights branch was
following the clear legislative scheme created by the Code. As Dickson J.
points out in his dissenting judgment, there are two standards set by the Code
with respect to the prohibition of discriminatory behaviour.18 Private in-
stitutions are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of a list of prescribed
forms of discrimination such as race, religion, colour, or sex. Public insti-
tutions (that is, those that provide services customarily available to the public)
are required to make their services available to anyone unless reasonable
cause exists for the denial of these services. With respect to these more "funda-
mental" activities, Dickson J. concludes that 'there is no inherent limitation
upon the possible prohibited forms of discrimination in these areas."'39
Laskin CJ.C. makes the same point in the following words:
I confine myself to s. 3. It deals not with all services of facilities but only with those
services or facilities which are customarily available to the public. The policy em-
bodied is plain and clear. Every person or class of persons is entitled to avail himself
or themselves of such services or facilities unless reasonable grounds are shown for
denying them or discriminating in respect of them. This court is obliged to enforce
this policy regardless of whether it thinks it to be ill-advised.
40
Despite the history of the legislation and its schemes of operation,
Professor Black suggests that the prohibition of all forms of unreasonable
conduct, whether or not it relates to discrimination, was not the legislative
intent. Rather, he sees his interpretation of reasonable cause as being "consis-
tent with the other decided cases. ' 41 Unfortunately the author's insistence
that the test for determining the reasonableness of the denial of services be
related to discrimination against an identifiable group appears to lean heavily
in the direction of attempting to formulate an acceptable definition of all
things that could fall within the meaning of the phrase "reasonable casue"
34 Day, "Recent Developments in Human Rights," in B.C. Dept. of Lab., Labour
Research Bulletin (Victoria: Dept. of Lab., 1977) 16 at 17.
35 Id. at 22.
36 Id. at 19.
37 Id. at 21.
38 Supra note 2, at 459 (S.C.R.), 594 (D.L.R.), 137 (W.W.R.).
39 d. at 460 (S.C.R.), 595 (D.L.R.), 138 (W.W.R.).
40Id. at 447 (S.C.R.), 584 (D.L.R.), 133 (W.W.R.).
41 Supra note 1, at 653.
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as used in the British Columbia Human Rights Code. However, as a matter
of long-established law, whether a matter is reasonable or not has to be
decided with reference to the particular facts of the instant case and in light of
the totality of the circumstances in any particular case.42 No formula can be
devised to delimit all unreasonable behaviour prohibited by section 3 of the
Code. Though Professor Black asserts that his interpretation is consistent with
the purposes of human rights legislation, he appears to have failed to give the
unique aspects of the Code their due weight. The purposes of human rights
legislation are in a constant state of flux just as forms of discrimination and
popular bias continually shift. It is not so extraordinary a measure for the
legislature to insist that those providing services to the public be reasonable in
determining whether to withhold them from anyone.
The decided cases that Professor Black alludes to as consistent with this
conclusion are not discussed.43 While it may be conceded as a general state-
ment of law that any legislative enactment should be defined in order to
promote its general purpose and preamble, such a broad principle can scarcely
be used to justify a reinterpretation of the legislation in question in face of its
plain and ordinary meaning.
While legislative intention is always at best unclear, the drafters of the
Code may well have intended to broaden the scope of the Code in order to
avoid the difficulty that human rights branches have had in other provincial
jurisdictions in proving the existence of bias.
It has always been a stumbling block for enforcers of human rights
legislation to prove the actual existence of bias. Seldom do those who dis-
criminate proclaim their biases openly. By broadening the words in the
manner that section 3 does in the Code, the problem of having to prove the
existence of an aciual bias against an identifiable group is done away with.
While the scope of the legislation may thereby be broadened, so also is its
effectiveness.
This was evidently the case with the British Columbia Human Rights
Code. The number of complaints investigated by the human rights branch
increased from twenty-seven in 1970 to 714 in 1975.44 Not surprisingly, many
42 See supra note 9.
4 3 Supra note 1, at 653-54.
44 See Day, supra note 34, at 16.









* The decline in the number of complaints investigated from 1975 to 1976 may be
associated with the election of a Social Credit government, which appeared to be
less responsive to the human rights needs of British Columbians than the previous
[VOL. 18, NO. 4
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of the individuals availing themselves of protection under the legislation did
so on the basis of discrimination "without reasonable cause" rather than on
the enumerated grounds.
45
Professor Black's suggestion that the phrase "reasonable cause" be inter-
preted to relate only to conduct that has a discriminatory effect upon an
identifiable group constitutes a narrowing of the scope of the Code. While
Professor Black's solution purports to clarify the debate concerning how
reasonable cause is to be assessed, he himself acknowledges that his solution
adds further ambiguity concerning the meaning of the word "group."
46
It would appear that only Laskin C.J.C.'s interpretation of the words
in controversy, giving them their plain and ordinary meaning rather than
reading into them interpretations that are not there, avoids the particular
problems encountered by this redefinition.47
The confusion introduced by Professor Black into the discussion con-
cerning the meaning of the words "reasonable cause" is evident when he comes
to discuss the issue of freedom of the press, which he regards as the central
question before the Supreme Court of Canada. He expresses concern at the
"considerable discretion" that the legislature has given to the human rights
branch because of the use of the phrase "reasonable cause." "Discretion can
be abused," he argues, "and it is worth considering whether there is a risk that
the Human Rights Code could be misapplied so as to restrict free speech
unduly. "48
Of course, the objective measure of reasonableness has been used in
government. In fact, in 1975, the NDP's Labour Minister appointed twenty-five
Boards but the Social Credit Labour Minister appointed only ten. During this same
period, the previous policy of the Human Rights Branch to advertise that its services
were available was discontinued. In addition, there was severe understaffing of two
of the Human Rights Branch offices in Prince George and Victoria. See The Van-
couver Sun, January 28, 1978.
45 See Day, id.
Table II - Nature of Complaints, 1976
Number %
Race 98 17




Sex & Marital Status 22 4
Marital Status 53 9
Religion 9 2
Age 32 6
Political Belief 5 1
Criminal Conviction 14 2
Without Reasonable Cause 82 14
Total 578 100
46 Supra note 1, at 653n. 20.
4 7 Supra note 2, at 447-48 (S.C.R.), 585 (D.L.R.), 133 (W.W.R.).
48 Supra note 1, at 665.
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other contexts without resulting in judicial abuse of other competing interests.
For example, the test of reasonableness has traditionally been applied in
adoption cases when courts in England have had to deal with whether or not
such proceedings should continue notwithstanding the refusal of the actual
parents to consent.49 The case law indicates that there has rarely been a
danger that the interests of natural parents would be abused or that the
interests of the child would be made secondary to those of the parents. The
test has usually resulted in the courts making an objective assessment of the
particular facts of any given situation and there has been no attempt to
formulate an all-encompassing interpretation of the meaning of the word
"reasonableness" that would result in certain factors (the child's interest, the
parents' right to refuse) being given predetermined weight independent of the
given circumstances of any particular situation. Professor Black fails to
provide examples of abuse that may have taken place either in the adminis-
tration of the British Columbia Human Rights Code in the administration of
human rights statutes containing similar words, or in the long standing ex-
perience of the common law where the test of reasonableness has been applied
to providers of public transportation services and other similar facilities. His
concern about the possible abuse of the discretion also seems to contradict
his personal opinion, expressed elsewhere in his case comment,ro that the
boards of inquiry should be permitted to retain jurisdiction with respect to
the issue of reasonable cause.
Professor Black's solution to the problem of the Code having a "potential
conflict with freedom of expression" 51 simply involves providing a formula for
reasonableness. His suggestion that the Court could have imposed a variety
of limitations on the meaning of the words "reasonable cause"'52 vitiates the
very point of the pragmatic test of reasonableness. His suggestions that the
Court could have specified that a newspaper could have refused an advertise-
ment when its large size would require newspaper columns to be restricted
or the suggestion that the Court "could have acknowledged the right of the
paper to edit offensive language in a non-discriminatory manner"''  are
matters that cannot be elaborated as principles of law. If in fact the situation
arises where an advertisement is given of such a large size or contains offensive
language, the Board of Inquiry would be the best party to determine whether
or not the refusal or discrimination is reasonable in the circumstances. The
Board would be able to view the entire situation and give these factors such
weight as they would determine within the context of the particular case.54
4 9 See supra note 9.
5 Supra note 1, at 659.
51 Id. at 665.
52 Id.
53 Id.
4 The language of The Honourable Mr. Justice MacDonald of the Supreme Court of
British Columbia is most apt in this regard. He held that:
Whether particular circumstances amount to reasonable cause for denial or dis-
crimination under s. 3 is purely a question of fact. It must be decided as a matter of
law, under a proper definition of the phrase "reasonable cause". The only restraints
which the law places upon the triers of fact are the provisions of s. 3(2). They may
(VOL. 18, No. 4
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By leaving such determination on questions of fact to the Board, the Board
could also block attempts by providers of public services to discriminate in
fact against identifiable groups under the pretext of reserving for themselves
certain rights. Professor Black's suggestion that Dickson J.'s dissenting judg-
ment made a start in the direction of elaborating a test for reasonableness and
limiting its applicability in certain situations is difficult to understand.
Dickson J. emphasizes that reasonable cause should be judged by an
objective test.i5 This underlies the view that no predetermined weight should
be given to defined factors and that each denial should be dealt with on its
own facts. Further, the distinction that Dickson J. makes by "emphasizing the
immunity of news and editorial columns from regulation"' 0 does not place
limitations on the words "reasonable cause;" on the contrary, it merely reflects
his belief that in the context of the British Columbia Human Rights Code the
news and editorial columns are not a service customarily available to the
public. This is the only interpretation that could be made of Dickson J.'s
comments and it is difficult to see how Professor Black could possibly relate
this distinction to the meaning of the words "reasonable cause."
The main flaw that emerges when Professor Black deals with the issue of
freedom of the press in the broader context of the significance of the case is his
ready acceptance of what the majority purports to be deciding rather than
dealing with what it is actually deciding. He appears to favour Martland J.'s
assertion that the key issues posed on the appeal were the parameters of
section 3 in light of the need to protect freedom of the press. 57 The majority,
however, far from resolving this issue, decided the case by determining that
the facilities that were refused were beyond the scope of the legislation as not
being customarily available to the public. Thus, the broad generalizations
concerning the importance of freedom of the press and the reference to the
Canadian Bill of Rights and American case law in this connection, strictly
speaking, cannot be broadly regarded as intrinsically related to the ratio of the
case and in the final analysis, may be regarded as obiter dicta.
As a result of his failure to focus on what the Court actually decides,
Professor Black's dissertation on the significance of the case for freedom of
speech becomes somewhat scholastic and abstracted. Clearly central to the
considerations of the majority was the fact that the Vancouver Sun daily
published a disclaimer reserving to itself the right to edit the contents of the
not find the race, religion, colour, ancestry, or place of origin of any person or class
of persons reasonable cause unless it relates to the maintenance of public decency
or to the determination of premiums or benefits under contracts of insurance. What
the appellant's submission does is to take some elements-what it submits are the
circumstances of its case-and ask the Court to find that, as a matter of law, they
must constitute reasonable cause. But it is really an invasion of the area of fact. If
the appellant's submision is sound, how long is the list of different plausible circum-
stances which the Court would be bound to find constituted reasonable cause?
Cited in the judgment of Seaton J.A. in the Court of Appeal: supra note 17, at 502-503
(D.L.R.), 218 (W.W.R.).
55 Supra note 1, at 665.
GO Id.
57 Id. at 672-75.
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submitted advertisements.58 The chain of logic constructed by the majority
weakens considerably in the absence of such a disclaimer, notwithstanding
the way in which the majority clothed its decision in broad language con-
cerning freedom of the press.
In light of this analysis, the conundrum contemplated by Professor
Black, wherein traditional "liberals" on issues of freedom of speech voted
against the Vancouver Sun's right to reject the advertisement while the tradi-
tional "conservatives" supported its right, becomes somewhat more solvable.
It is no longer necessary to wonder about the turn taken by the Supreme
Court of Canada towards embracing freedom of the press. It is no longer
necessary to speculate whether the majority invoked the rule of construction
that legislation should be construed narrowly if a broader construction were
to infringe upon a fundamental right. Nor is it necessary to attempt to explain
the "striking" contrast between the Court's approach to freedom of expression
in the instant case and in the recent Dupond59 case where freedom of expres-
sion was not given any significant weight despite the fact that one of the
central issues before the Supreme Court of Canada in that particular case
involved the validity of a by-law banning parades and demonstrations.
Professor Black canvasses at length the various other cases dealing with
freedom of expression decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in the recent
past in order to search for clues that might explain the volte-face in GA TE. He
concludes that freedom of speech was relegated to a lesser position in many
of these other cases and fails to explain what distinctive factual features before
the Court in the GATE case resulted in such heavy emphasis being placed on
freedom of the press.60 This failure is especially noteworthy when one realizes
that the other cases pose a more significant threat to freedom of expression
than the "threat" to the Vancouver Sun by GATE. Professor Black's inability
to adequately explain the Court's favourable references to United States
decisions concerning fundamental liberties and the positive references made
to the Canadian Bill of Rights shows a serious weakness in his analysis.
Professor Black's essential thesis is that the Court was forced to make a
fundamental value judgment about the relative importance of the two com-
peting claims to freedom of expression. He hypothesizes three possible ex-
planations for the change of direction contained in GATE.0' The first is that
the Court now has decided to give freedom of speech more weight than it has
in the recent past. The second explanation is that the Court assigned little
weight to protecting minorities and establishing equality. The third choice
that he puts forward is that the Court is unwilling to extend protection to
homosexuals.
With respect to the first choice, Professor Black expresses doubt about
this interpretation on the basis that the Court was less than forthright about
changing its approach if in fact the GATE case did constitute a change of
58 Supra note 2, at 455 (S.C.R.), 591 (D.L.R.), 125 (W.W.R.).
59 A.G. Can v. Dupond, [1973] 2 S.C.R. 770, 84 D.L.R. (3d) 420, 5 M.P.L.R. 4.
60 Supra note 1, at 663.
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approach. In addition, he ruminates quixotically over the liberal/conservative
split, pointing out that four of the six justices in the majority approach the
issue in a manner inconsistent with their positions expressed in previous
cases.12 He appears to hold out some optimism for believing that a real shift
has taken place in the Court's attitude to freedom of expression, and he even
suggests that "there should be a suitable return on [the] jurisprudential in-
vestment"0 3 placed in the interests and rights.
Professor Black appears to favour the second hypothesis, stating that
perhaps GATE is "best explained on the basis that the Court continues to
assign more importance to the right of freedom of commerce than to egali-
tarian rights."
64
There can be no argument with Professor Black on this point. The
history of the Supreme Court for at least the past forty years has properly
given it a reputation for narrowly construing human rights statutes. However,
one hesitates to concede that it is freedom of commerce that is being protected
in the GATE case. As Dickson J. points out in his dissenting judgment,
There is an important distinction to be made between legislation designed to control
the editorial content of a newspaper and legislation designed to control discrim-
inatory practices in the offering of commercial services to the public. We are dealing
in this case with the classified advertising section of a newspaper. The primary pur-
pose of commercial advertising is to advance the economic welfare of the newspaper.
That part of the paper is not concerned with freedom of speech on matters of
public concern as a condition of democratic polity, but rather with the provision
of a "service or facility customarily available to the public" with a view to profit.
As such, in British Columbia a newspaper is impressed with a statutory obligation
not to deny space or discriminate with respect to classified advertising, unless for
reasonable cause. It should also be made clear that the right of access with which
we are here concerned has nothing to do with those parts of the paper where one
finds news or editorial content, parts which can in no way be characterized as a
service customarily available to the public. The effect of s. 3 of the British Columbia
Human Rights Code is to require newspapers within the province to adopt adver-
tising policies which are not in violation of the principles set out in the Code.0 5
A careful analysis of the comments of Martland J. on the freedom of the
press aspect of the case conclusively indicates that what is really involved is
not freedom of commerce but freedom to hold prejudices. The majority
reasoning on freedom of the press contains numerous non sequiturs. There
is too great a jump in logic from citing Burger C.J. of the Supreme Court of
the United States approvingly with respect to the right of the press to exercise
editorial control and judgment to the right of the Vancouver Sun to refuse
advertisements from GATE to its classified advertising section. GATE was
not asking the Vancouver Sun to approve its views editorially; it was simply
seeking to avail itself of a service customarily available to the public with
respect to placing advertisements to third parties.
When Professor Black writes about how the majority balanced rights in
the GATE case, one wonders whether he is using those words ironically. He
02 Id. at 673.
3Id. at 675.
64 Id.
05 Supra note 2, at 469 (S.C.R.), 601-602 (D.L.R.), 145-46 (W.W.R.).
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himself concedes that the Court's apparent commitment to freedom of the
press lacks forthrightness and seems to be incomplete and contradictory.
Similarly, Professor Black admits that the Court interpreted the human rights
statutes in question in a very restrictive fashion at great cost to the homo-
sexual minority.06
It would appear to be Professor Black's third thesis, namely, that the
court was unwilling to extend protection to homosexuals, that is most con-
sistent with the analysis of the case presented in this article. This interpre-
tation would explain why the Court appeared to endorse the interests of
freedom of expression when it was only a right to discriminate that was being
protected. This interpretation also explains why the Court was willing to
decide the case on a point that had not been argued before the Court and
that involved interference with a finding of fact made by the Board of
Inquiry. While the case may conceivably end up having some significance as
obiter to those advocating freedom of the press in circumstances where such
freedom may in fact be threatened, the greater likelihood is that the major
impact of the case will be felt in the narrowing of the scope of the British
Columbia Human Rights Code and its ability to protect the human rights
of minority groups.
66 Supra note 1, at 675.
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